Abstract. We introduce and formally study games in which the goals of players relate to the epistemic states of players in the game. For example, one player might have a goal that another player knows a certain proposition, while another player might have as a goal that a certain player does not know some proposition. The formal model we use to study epistemic games is a variation of the increasingly popular Boolean games model in which each player controls a number of Boolean variables, but has limited ability to see the truth values of the overall set of formulae that hold in the game. Each player in an epistemic Boolean game has a goal, defined as a formula of modal epistemic logic. Using such a language for goals allows us to explicitly and compactly represent desirable epistemic states. After motivating and formally defining epistemic Boolean games as a concise representation of epistemic Kripke structures, we investigate their complexity and study their properties.
Introduction
In our everyday lives, we all quite naturally have goals and aspirations that relate to the epistemic states (knowledge and belief) of other agents. You want your children to know that you love them; you want your boss to know you work hard; the politician wants you to know he is honest; and so on. The formal analysis of such epistemic states is of course a well-established research topic in artificial intelligence, with modal logic and Kripke semantics being the preeminent tools of choice in such work [1] . Our aim in this paper is to begin to extend this research to the game theoretic aspects of systems in which the motivations of players relate to the epistemic states of others. Doing so, the following question seems very relevant: If all players act rationally to bring about their goals, then what epistemic states will result in equilibrium? We will refer to games in which the goals and preferences of players relate to the epistemic states of other players as epistemic games. In the present paper, we shall restrict our attention to knowledge, leaving the study of belief to future work.
As the basis for our study, we adapt the increasingly popular game theoretic model of Boolean games [2] [3] [4] [5] . More precisely, we introduce epistemic Boolean games (ebgs). In such a game, (as in regular Boolean games), each player i is associated with a set of Boolean variables Φ i , which are under his control in the sense that he can assign Boolean values to the variables Φ i in any way that he chooses. That is, the strategies available to a player i in an ebg are the possible Boolean assignments that can be made to the variables Φ i . The outcome of a Boolean game is a valuation for the overall set of Boolean variables Φ, which will be composed of the individual assignments made by the players i in the game to their variables Φ i . A player i is not assumed to have perfect information of the game. This we formally capture by visibility sets Θ i , that is, sets of propositional formulae. If a formula ϕ is in Θ i -in which case we say that "i can see ϕ"-it means that player i can distinguish states in which ϕ holds from ones in which this is not the case. A limit case is where every player can see every atomic formula, in which case the game is one of perfect information.
As in regular Boolean games, each player i is assumed to have a goal that he desires to be achieved. In conventional Boolean games, player i 's goal γ i is represented as a formula of propositional logic. In our present work, however, the goal is assumed to be represented as a formula of modal multi-agent epistemic logic [1] . Thus, player i might have the goal that another player j comes to know something (γ i = K j ϕ), while player j might have a goal that another player k does not know something (γ j = ¬K k ψ). As in conventional Boolean games, the ability of a player i to influence whether his goal is achieved lies within the variables Φ i under his control; but our ebgs bring a new twist to this story, since the visibility sets of each player will have a part in determining whether a players's goal is achieved. The underlying ebg model we use (with sets of controlled variables and visibility sets) derives in part from the work of van der Hoek et al. on epistemic logics of propositional control [6] , which in turn derives from logics of propositional control [7] .
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, in the following section we introduce ebgs. We then formalise Nash equilibria for our games, and investigate the complexity of decision problems relating to Nash equilibria. Sections 4 and 5 concern the conciseness of the representation of the strategic and epistemic situations that ebgs provide with respect to Kripke structures and regular Boolean games, respectively. We conclude in section 6 with a brief discussion of related work and some issues for future research.
Epistemic Boolean Games
We adapt the basic model of Boolean games (see, e.g., [2] [3] [4] [5] ) to model partial information.
Epistemic Logic Let B = { , ⊥} be the set of Boolean truth values, with " " being truth and "⊥" being falsity. Throughout the paper, we will use Φ to denote a fixed, finite, non-empty set of Boolean variables, with typical members p, q, . . . etc. A valuation is a total function v : Φ → B, assigning truth or falsity to every Boolean variable. Let V denote the set of all valuations (over Φ). In the interests of brevity, we sometimes use a binary representation of valuations; for example, if Φ = {p, q}, then the valuation 01 would be the one making p false and q true, assuming a natural order on the propositional variables.
We make use of a multi-agent epistemic modal logic, which we will refer to as EL [1] . The language of EL is that of the well-known multi-modal logic S5 n . The language EL extends classical propositional logic with a collection of indexed unary modal operators K i , where the intended interpretation of a formula K i ϕ is that "agent i knows ϕ." Formally, given a set Φ of propositional variables the syntax of EL(Φ) is given by the following grammar:
where p is a Boolean variable in Φ and i is an agent. We assume that the remaining classical connectives-"∧" (conjunction), "→" (material implication), "↔" (material bi-implication)-are defined in the standard way. The propositional fragment of EL over Φ-i.e., the set of formulae without occurrences of the epistemic operators K i -we denote by L(Φ).
The semantics for the epistemic logic S5 n , as formulated in the language EL(Φ), is defined with respect to tuples K = (W , R 1 , . . . , R n , π), also referred to as S5 n Kripke structures. Here, W is a non-empty set of (possible) worlds and, for each agent i , R i ⊆ W × W is an equivalence relation over W . Finally, π : W × Φ → B is a valuation function, indicating the truth value of every Boolean variable in every world. For the purposes of this paper we assume W to be finite. The formulae of EL(Φ) are interpreted with respect to pointed structures, i.e., pairs of the form (K , w ) as follows [1, pp.18-19] : An atom p is true in (K , w ) iff π(w , p) = ; the clauses for negation and disjunction are standard, and for knowledge, we have
Epistemic Boolean Games The standard framework of Boolean games involves a set of agents or players, each of which has a goal formulated as a formula γ i of classical propositional logic and a set of Boolean variables she controls, in the sense that he has the unique ability to set their value. Each player strives to satisfy her goal by appropriately setting the values of the variables she controls. Every such setting can be analysed as a strategic game in which the strategies of the players are given by the ways they can assign values to the variables they control. A profile of strategies then determines a unique truth value assignment or valuation to all propositional variables. These are taken as the outcomes of the game. Moreover, each player strictly prefers states that satisfy her goal to ones that do not and is indifferent otherwise. The difficulty is that a player's goal γ i may contain variables controlled by other players j = i , who will also be trying to choose values for their variables in Φ j so as to get their goals γ j satisfied, the satisfaction of which may in turn dependend on the variables Φ i .
The setting we consider in this paper is similar, except that each player's goal is represented as a formula γ i of the epistemic language EL(Φ). In order to evaluate the players' epistemic goals, each player is endowed with a visibility set Θ i consisting of formulae in the propositional fragment L(Φ) of EL(Φ). The idea is that player i can completely and correctly perceive truth values of the formulae in Θ i , i.e., player i can only distinguish outcomes that differ with respect to the truth values they assign to some of the formulae contained in Θ i . A formula of the form K i ϕ then holds in a particular outcome if ϕ holds in all outcomes i cannot distinguish from that outcome.
Formally, we define an epistemic Boolean game for EL(Φ) (hereafter simply "game") as a tuple
-N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents (also called the players of the game); -Φ = {p, q, . . .} is a finite set of Boolean variables; -Φ i ⊆ Φ is the set of Boolean variables under the unique control of i ∈ N ; -γ i is an EL(Φ) formula representing the goal of player i ∈ N ; and -Θ i ⊆ L(Φ) is a finite visibility set for player i ∈ N consisting of propositional formulae, with the intended interpretation that player i is able to correctly observe the truth values of the propositional formulae in Θ i .
As usual in Boolean games, we will require that Φ i ∩ Φ j = ∅ for i = j , and that
, an allocation of truth or falsity to all the variables under i 's control. Let V i denote the set of choices for player i . The intuitive interpretation we give to V i is that it defines the actions or strategies available to player i . An outcome is a collection of choices, one for each player. Formally, an outcome for a game is a tuple v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ V 1 ×· · ·×V n . An outcome uniquely defines an overall valuation for the variables in Φ and for this reason we often treat outcomes for games as if they were valuations, for example, writing v (p) to denote the value of variable p ∈ Φ under the assignment corresponding to outcome v . We will also equivocate the set of valuations and the set of outcomes writing V for V 1 × · · · × V n .
To model partial information, for every visibility set Θ i , we define an equivalence relation ∼ Θi over outcomes as follows such that for all v , v ∈ V:
Thus, v ∼ Θi v if and only if v and v agree on the truth value of the formulae in Θ i . In the interests of readability, where there is no possibility of confusion, we will write ∼ i instead of ∼ Θi .
One natural constraint to consider in our setting would be that Θ i ⊆ Φ, i.e., that player i can only perceive the value of atomic propositions or propositional variables. Such games we will refer to as atomic games. Most of the examples in this paper pertain to this setting and we will see that they have quite a specific structure. It would also be natural to require that Φ i ⊆ Θ i , i.e., a player can see his own choice with respect to the variables he controls. However, we will generally not place this as a requirement on games. Furthermore, if G is such that for every player i ∈ N we have Φ ⊆ Θ i , we say that G is a game of perfect information: in a game of perfect information, every player can see every propositional variable.
We interpret formulae of EL(Φ) with respect to pointed games, i.e., pairs (G, v ) consisting of a game G = (N , Φ, Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n , γ 1 , . . . , γ n , Θ 1 , . . . , Θ n ) and an outcome v , as follows (again, we only give the epistemic clause)
Observe that this semantics depend on neither Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n nor γ 1 , . . . , γ n .
We assume that a player i strictly prefers all those outcomes that satisfy its goal γ i over all those that do not, but is indifferent between outcomes that satisfy its goal, and is indifferent between outcomes that do not satisfy its goal. We define for each player i a utility function u i : V 1 × · · · × V n → {0, 1} over outcomes representing these preferences as follows. Baby just wants to be picked up. Formally, the goals are:
The situation (call the game G 1 ) is depicted in Figure 1(a) . Now suppose that Mother decides to pick up Baby, but Father does not, i.e., ¬p ∧ q. This obviously fulfils the goal γ 2 , and even K 2 (p ∨ q) ∧ ¬(p ∧ q). Note, however, that Father is still unhappy with this outcome. Indeed, it is easy to see that ¬γ 1 is true in this outcome. Note that each parent can bring about p ∨ q, but not the fact that the spouse knows this.
We are now in a position to apply the well-known notion of (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium [8] to ebgs. Formally, an outcome (v 1 , . . . , v i , . . . , v n ) is a Nash equilibrium if there is no player i ∈ N and choice v i ∈ V i for i such that
Thus, an outcome is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to obtain a better outcome for themselves, under the assumption that every other player stays with their choice. The Nash equilibria of game G will be denoted by N (G). Observe that, in general, we have that v is a Nash equilibrium in G if and only if for all players i , Example 1 (continued). Recall the nursery Example 1. We noted that the outcome where ¬p ∧q satisfies K 2 (p ∨q)∧¬(p ∧q). This is indeed a Nash equilibrium, even though Father's goal γ 1 is not satisfied (Father does not know that Mother will go). It is a Nash equilibrium, because, given this outcome, father on his own cannot fulfil his goal: the epistemic goal K 1 K 2 (p ∨ q) cannot be satisfied in our model. Note that, since Baby cannot influence any proposition, every outcome has the property that it cannot unilaterally deviate and improve its outcome, i.e., it can never prevent an outcome from being a Nash equilibrium. Note now that knowledge is power: if we change the game to G 2 , in which Θ 1 = {p, q} (but keep the rest as in G 1 ), then Father will be informed as to whether mother satisfies her own goal by making q true, and hence ¬p ∧ q is a Nash equilibrium for this game in which both parents and the child are happy.
Computational Complexity
In this section we analyse the computational complexity of a number of natural problems relating to ebgs. First, the Model Checking problem for EL is as follows (cf. [10] ):
Model Checking: Given: Pointed game (G, v ) and EL formula ϕ. Question: Is it the case that (G, v ) |= EL ϕ?
We leave out the proof of the following due to lack of space. Proposition 2. The Model Checking problem for EL is PSPACE-complete.
As an aside, we remark that this result may at first seem surprising, given that the problem of model checking formulae of S5 n over Kripke structures may be solved in polynomial time [1, pp. 63-64]. There is no contradiction, Input: Game G and outcome v for G Output: "yes" if v ∈ N (G), "no" otherwise.
1
return "no" 6 end if 7 end for 8 end if 9 end for 10 return "yes" Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Membership however: we are interpreting our EL formulae with respect to games, which can be understood as compact representations of Kripke structures. The polynomial time computational results for model checking over Kripke structures assumes that each state is explicitly listed in the input to the problem, which we do not assume. Thus, model checking S5 n over Kripke structures assumes an input that in the worst case is exponentially larger than our game representation. As a general rule of thumb in complexity analysis, the more compact a representation is, the higher will be the complexity of the decision problems associated with these structures (see, e.g., [11, pp. 492-495] ).
Two natural decision problems suggest themselves relating to the Nash equilibria of ebgs (cf. [12, pp. 8-9] ). The first asks whether a given outcome v is a Nash equilibrium of a game G. We call this problem Membership:
Membership:
Instance: Game G and outcome v for G. Question: Is it the case that v ∈ N (G)?
We first prove the upper bound for the Membership problem; we postpone the lower bound for the moment.
Proposition 3. Membership for ebgs is in PSPACE.
Proof. First observe that from Proposition 2, the model-checking problem for EL is PSPACE-complete. Let G be the game and let v = (v 1 , . . . , v i , . . . , v n ) be the outcome given in the problem instance. Then, Algorithm 1 decides the problem in PSPACE. The loop on lines (1)- (9) checks whether any player has a beneficial deviation: if it finds such a beneficial deviation, the algorithm returns "no" (line 5), indicating v ∈ N (G). We claim that the overall algorithm operates in PSPACE. To see this, observe that for each player i ∈ N we carry out a single PSPACE check (line 2, Proposition 2) followed by a loop (lines 3-7) that iterates through all elements of V i , in each case carrying out a PSPACE check (Proposition 2 again). The loop on lines 3-7 is in PSPACE as a consequence of the fact that PSPACE = PSPACE PSPACE .
Since PSPACE is closed under sequential PSPACE operations, the outer loop operates in PSPACE. We conclude that the overall algorithm operates in PSPACE.
The second problem simply asks whether there exist any Nash equilibria for a given ebg G. We call this problem Non-Emptiness:
Non-Emptiness: Instance: Game G. Question: Is it the case that N (G) = ∅?
The proofs of the following propositions are left out due to lack of space.
Proposition 4. Non-Emptiness for ebgs is PSPACE-complete.
Given this, we can prove the lower bound for the Membership problem:
Proposition 5. Membership for ebgs is PSPACE-hard.
Epistemic Boolean Games versus Kripke Structures
The semantics we have given to EL in terms of epistemic Boolean games is very close to Kripke semantics, with outcomes for games essentially playing the role of possible worlds. Let us make this idea both explicit and precise. We argue that Boolean games of incomplete information can represent the same situations modelled by S5 n Kripke structures and, moreover, that they sometimes can do so significantly more concisely.
We adapt the standard definition of bisimulation for modal logic [13, pp.64-67] to games and Kripke structures. Given a game G for EL(Φ) and a Kripke structure K for EL(Φ ), for any Ψ ⊆ Φ∩Φ , we say that G and K are Ψ -bisimilar if there exists a relation Z ⊆ V × W such that for all outcomes v and all possible worlds w :
and for some i ∈ N and v we have v ∼ i v , then there is some w such that Z( v , w ) and R i (w , w ); and -if Z( v , w ) and for some i ∈ N and w we have R i (w , w ), then there is some v such that Z( v , w ) and v ∼ i v .
We write (G, v ) ∼ =Ψ (K , w ) to mean that there is a Ψ -bisimulation relation Z between G and K such that Z( v , w ). If Φ = Φ = Ψ we omit the subscript in ∼ =Ψ .
The key point about bisimulations is the following, readily established result.
, then for all formulae ϕ ∈ EL(Ψ ) we have:
We easily show that for every game G there exists a bisimilar Kripke structure K G . Given an ebg G = (N , Φ, Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n , γ 1 , . . . , γ n , Θ 1 , . . . , Θ n ), we define the
Then it is immediate by construction that we have:
Proposition 7. Let G be a game, v an outcome, and K G be the Kripke structure induced by G. Then,
Notice that the construction of the set of worlds in K G makes the exponential blow up of size in moving from games G to Kripke structures explicit. The previous result essentially tells us that for every game G there is an "equivalent" Kripke structure K , where equivalence is measured in terms of bisimulation.
Likewise, for every finite Kripke structure K = (W , R 1 , . . . , R n , π) for EL(Φ), a Φ-bisimilar ebg G K exists. This ebg, however, is defined on an extended language, which also involves propositional variables for every possible world w ∈ W . Assuming without loss of generality that W ∩ Φ = ∅, we let Ψ = Φ ∪ W . Moreover, define for every w ∈ W a formula χ(w ) as follows. Given K = (W , R 1 , . . . , R n , π), we define for each agent i and each world w ,
) the set of worlds that player i cannot distinguish from w in K along with their interpretation of the propositional variables. That is, if θ K i (w ) is in player i 's visibility set, i can distinguish worlds that are in {w ∈ W : R i (w , w )} from those that are not. Moreover, as K is an S5 n model, each R i is an equivalence relation. Hence, We find that Z is witness to the fact that G K and K are Φ-bisimilar, giving us the following result (proof left out due to lack of space).
Proposition 8. Let K be a Kripke structure, w a world, and let G K be the game induced by K . Then,
However, if we restrict ourselves to atomic games, i.e., games with visibility sets Θ i that consist of propositional variables, Proposition 8 (or the converse of Proposition 6) does not hold.
Proposition 9.
There are Kripke structures K over N , Φ for which there is no atomic game G over N , Φ such that G ∼ = K .
Proof. Consider the S5 n Kripke structure K with N = {1, 2} and Φ = {p} as depicted in Figure 2 . (Both R 1 and R 2 are equivalence relations, but for clarity we have not drawn the reflexive arrows). Note that K 1 p ∨ K 1 ¬p means that 1 knows the value of p. In K , this is true in s, but not in t or u. Hence we have ∨K 1 ¬p) . However, we claim that in any atomic game G and any valuation v we have
To see the latter, suppose that (G, v ) |= EL K 1 p. This means not only that v (p) = , but also that p ∈ Θ 1 . To appreciate the latter, observe that p ∈ Θ 1 would imply that there is some u, which only differs from v in that it assigns ⊥ to p rather than , and, since v and u agree on all other variables (in particular those in Θ 1 ), for which v ∼ i u . But this in turn implies that (G, v ) |= EL ¬K i p, a contradiction. But since p ∈ Θ 1 , it is obvious that G |= EL K 1 p ∨ K 1 ¬p, and hence we have (
, and hence, by Proposition 2, there is no (G, v ) for which (G, v ) ∼ = (K , s).
The upshot of this discussion is that atomic games induce Kripke structures with a very particular structure. Specifically, they induce Kripke structures in which: (i ) the set of worlds corresponds exactly to the set of possible valuations;
Otterloo also considered the use of the strategic ability logic ATL [17] and its epistemic variant ATEL [18] . The work differs from the present paper in that we consider a Boolean games framework, with visibility sets implicitly defining epistemic accessibility relations; we also allow for players to have goals explicitly represented as formulae of epistemic logic.
Agotnes and van Ditmarsch also considered closely related issues [19] . They introduced public announcement games. The foundation for their study was the growing body of work on dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) [20] . In dynamic epistemic logic, agents are allowed to make announcements, which may be simple objective statements about the state of the world (e.g., "p is true") or may be more complex announcements involving statements about the knowledge or ignorance of agents (e.g., "I don't know p").Ågotnes and van Ditmarsch investigated how players in a game could use such announcements to bring about states of knowledge. The main difference is that the announcements considered byÅgotnes and van Ditmarsch are much richer than the mechanisms available to players in our games for bringing about epistemic states; and the semantics are correspondingly much more technically involved than in our setting. Our setting offers a much more compact representation for epistemic games than that of Agotnes and van Ditmarsch, and one that is much closer to computational models. Additionally, we are able to prove results relating to (e.g.) the complexity of Nash equilibria that were not considered in [19] .
Finally, and perhaps the closest to the present paper is the work of Grant et al. on Boolean games in which players have (possibly incorrect) beliefs about the value of certain variables, and where an external principal is able to make announcements about these variables in order to influence the beliefs of the players within the game, and hence the rational choices that they subsequently make [21] . The model of belief studied by Grant et al is much more restricted than the model of knowledge we use in the present paper (every player simply believes every proposition is either true or false).
Several avenues suggest themselves for future work. First, we might look at richer computational models than simply setting variables to be true or false. For example, we might model games using a practical system specification language such as Reactive Modules [22] , and, correspondingly, allow for richer strategies as in the Alternating-time Temporal Logic [17] . This would bring the setting of epistemic games much closer to practical systems, and would make it possible to model practical protocols and systems. Second, we might consider the use of mixed (probabilistic) strategies. If players are permitted to use randomised strategies, then the set N (G) can be replaced by a probability distribution over outcomes. In this case, instead of asking whether, for example, player i knows ϕ in all outcomes, we can ask what the probability is that player i comes to know ϕ, assuming that players play Nash equilibrium strategies.
Third, the epistemic concept we have worked with in this paper is knowledge, in the sense of S5 modal logic [1] . It would also be interesting to consider the use of belief, e.g., in the sense of the modal logic KD45. Finally, it looks worthwhile to see whether the exponential blow-up when moving from games to Kripke models, can be avoided by adopting a slightly different perspective on Kripke models, as proposed in [9] , viewing them as compositions of smaller agent models.
